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The federal Constitution of Ethiopia provides the regional states - the constituent unit 
of the federation –with the power to draft, adopt and amend their own constitutions, 
thereby allowing each of the regional states to use its constitution, among others, to design 
and adopt a system and structure of local government fitting to its circumstances. This is 
particularly important since the regional states differ from each other in terms of territorial 
size, ethnic composition and economic and social circumstances, making a one-size-fits-all 
approach inappropriate to the design of local government. Nevertheless, all levels of 
government in Ethiopia are controlled, directly or indirectly, by one party; the Ethiopian 
Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF). Not only does it control all levels of 
government, the party has a highly centralised decision-making system founded on the 
principle of ‘democratic centralism’. Under this system, the party’s regional and local 
structures, which also control government institutions at those levels, are involved only in 
the execution of decisions passed by the centre. Given such a context, the establishment 
and empowerment of local government – which took place in two phases – were driven 
from the centre. The process of establishing local government was influenced by the 
political exigencies the ruling party faced at particular times and the choices it made in 
reaction to them. This has undermined the role of the regional states and the relevance of 
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Local government, which in many federal states is an exclusive competence of sub-
national units (states, cantons or provinces), is barely mentioned in the national 
constitutions of most federal countries, let alone recognised as an autonomous level of 
government.I Local government units play a critical social and economic role in many such 
countries,II and in Germany, India and South Africa,III for example, their institutional 
integrity is constitutionally protected and their role recognised. Yet, even so, only a few 
national constitutions – such as that of South Africa – go so far as to specify the number of 
tiers of local government and define their institutional organisation and financial sources.IV 
In the main, therefore, the task of defining the structure, powers, functional competences 
and resources of local government is left to the sub-national units, which often use their 
constitutions for doing so.V 
The same is also true of Ethiopia, a formerly centralised unitary state that became a 
federal state about two decades ago. Having created nine sub-national unitsVI (commonly 
referred to as regional states) and a federal city,VII the country’s 1995 Constitution makes a 
passing reference to local government, only to instruct and authorise the regional states to 
establish local government and determine its tiers, powers and functions.VIII To this and 
other effects, the Constitution also authorises them to draft, adopt and amend their own 
constitutions, thereby allowing each of the regional states to use its constitution to design 
and adopt a system and structure of local government fitting to its circumstances.IX This is 
particularly important since the regional states differ from each other in terms of territorial 
size, ethnic composition and economic and social circumstances, making a one-size-fits-all 
approach inappropriate to the design of local government.  
Nevertheless, all levels of government in Ethiopia are controlled, directly or indirectly, 
by one party; the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF). Not only 
does it control all levels of government, it has a highly centralised decision-making system 
founded on the principle of ‘democratic centralism’.X Under this system, the party’s 
regional and local structures, which also control government institutions at those levels, are 
involved only in the execution of decisions passed by the centre. 
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This paper argues that, given such a context, the establishment and empowerment of 
local government – which took place in two phases – were driven from the centre. The 
process of establishing local government was influenced by the political exigencies the 
ruling party faced at particular times and the choices it made in reaction to them. This has 
undermined the role of the regional states and the relevance of their constitutions in 
creating local government systems appropriate to their circumstances. The Ethiopian case 
is relevant since it shows that deprived of adequate recognition in a national constitution, 
local government in a federal system may fall victim of changes in political weather at 
national level.  
The paper first describes the institutional structures, powers and functions of 
Ethiopia’s federal and state governments. This is followed by a brief discussion of the 
ethnic, social, and economic contexts of the regional states, after which an overview is 
provided of the structure, functions and powers of local government in Ethiopia. The 
paper then discusses the political circumstances that led to the involvement of the EPRDF-
dominated federal government in the process of establishing local government, the role 
that the government played and the consequences thereof. 
 
2. Federal and state government in Ethiopia 
 
The FDRE Constitution, true to Ethiopia’s federal dispensation, provides for the 
establishment of two orders of government structured at federal and state level.XI The 
federal government has two federal houses: the House of Peoples Representatives (HoPR) 
and House of Federation (HoF). XII The HoPR, the lower house, is composed of elected 
parliamentarians and exercises legislative power.XIII The HoF, the upper house, consists of 
representatives of the country’s ethnic communities and deals with non-legislative matters 
pertaining to, among other things, self-determination of ethnic communities, inter-state 
disputes, the division of revenue, and resolution of disputes involving the interpretation of 
the federal Constitution.XIV The federal government also has a parliamentary executive as 
well as a judiciary.XV 
In a similar fashion, a state government is established in each of the nine regional 
states. Each of them, except Hareri and the SNNPR (Southern Nations, Nationalities and 
People's Region), has a unicameral legislative house, called State/Regional Council, with 
 
Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
93 
the power to adopt a state constitution and enact proclamations on state matters.XVI In the 
SNNPR an upper house known as the Council of Nationalities (CoN) has similar structural 
organisation and functions to that of the HoF.XVII In addition, each regional state has a 
parliamentary executive councilXVIII led by a regional chief administrator or president.XIX 
 
3. Political parties and elections 
 
Ethiopia has more than 79 registered political parties, most of which are organised 
along ethnic lines.XX The ruling party, the EPRDF, is a coalition of four ethnic-based 
political parties: the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara National Democratic 
Movement (ANDM), Oromo People Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and Southern 
Ethiopia Democratic Movement (SEPDM);XXI the latter, in turn, is a coalition of 20 small 
ethnic-based political parties.XXII The EPRDF is the ruling party at federal level, while the 
ANDM, OPDO, SEPDM and TPLF control the Amhara, Oromia, the SNNPR and Tigray 
regions, respectively. 
The country also has a number of other ethnic-based political parties which are 
affiliated to the EPRDF without formally being member organisations.XXIII They are the 
Somali People Democratic Party (SPDP), Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), 
Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples Democratic Unity Front (BPDUF), Gambella Peoples’ Unity 
Democratic Movement (GPUDM) and Hareri National League; these parties control the 
Somali, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regions, respectively.  
The remainders of Ethiopia’s political parties are opposition groups claiming to have 
policies and programmes different to those of the EPRDF and its affiliates.XXIV Most are 
ethnic-based, operate either alone or in coalition with each other, and almost every ethnic-
based party belonging or affiliated to the EPRDF seems to have a counterpart in the 
opposition camp.XXV 
 
4. The regional states and their ethnic, social and economic contexts 
 
Given that Ethiopia’s federation is a ‘federation of ethnic groups’, the boundaries of 
the regional states are demarcated along ethnic lines.XXVI None of these states is ethnically 
homogenous, however, even though the level of ethnic heterogeneity varies from one 
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region to another.XXVII The states of Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, Afar and Somali each bear 
the name of its dominant ethnic community, but in the other states no group has a 
majority; this is especially true of the SNNPR, Ethiopia’s most diverse state, which has 
approximately 56 ethnic communities. In addition, urban areas in the regional states usually 
have populations of ethnic migrants that run into the hundreds of thousands, if not higher. 
In Oromia, for example, more than three million ethnic migrants inhabit the region’s many 
cities.XXVIII 
Regional states also exhibit wide variation in territorial and population size. Oromia is 
the largest region both in territorial and population terms, followed by the Amhara regional 
state;XXIX at the other end of the spectrum is Hareri, a small city-state with a little more than 
150,000 inhabitantsXXX. The states differ, too, in their degree of social and economic 
development.XXXI The communities in the highland regions, which include, Amhara, Tigray, 
Oromia and much of the SNNPR, have a sedentary agrarian economy, while those in the 
lowland regions eke out a pastoralist livelihood.XXXII Compared to other parts of the 
country, the latter areas are characterised by extremely poor economic and infrastructural 
development, having been marginalised by previous national regimes.XXXIII 
 
5. Local government under Ethiopia’s federal Constitution 
 
As can be gathered from the above discussion, there are immense territorial, social, and 
economic differences among the nine regional states constituting the Ethiopian federation. 
In view of these factors, no single system of local governance is likely to suit all nine of 
Ethiopia’s regional states. The FDRE Constitution thus duly envisages that each regional 
state establishes a system appropriate to it by means of its constitution. The Constitution 
envisages the establishment of two categories of local government; ethnic and regular local 
governments.XXXIV  
 The ethnic local government, or more appropriately sub-regional government, is 
envisaged under Article 39 (3) of the FDRE Constitution. This provision recognises the 
right of each ethnic community in the country to territorial autonomy, without however 
implying that every ethnic community can have its own regional state. Implicitly the 
Constitution provides that the territorial autonomy envisaged under Article 39 (3) can be 
exercised through the establishment of ethnic-based sub-regional territorial and political 
 
Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
95 
units.XXXV The regular local government is envisaged under Article 50 (4) of the FDRE 
Constitution. The objective for the establishment this category of local government is 
enhancing the democratic participation of the public and the provision of service delivery. 
The Constitutions envisages that all of the nine regional states would establish the regular 
local government on wall-to-wall basis, unlike the ethnic local government, which is to be 
established where territorially concentrated sub-regional ethnic minorities are found. XXXVI  
The Constitution leaves to the regional states the determination of the number of tiers 
and units of local government.XXXVII The question, then, is whether the states have actually 
done so: Have they acted autonomously and effectively in exercising their power to draft 
and adopt constitutionally-designed systems of local government tailored to their individual 
circumstances? Before engaging with this issue, though, it is necessary to obtain a synoptic 
view of the structure, powers, and functions of local government in Ethiopia. 
 
6. Local government under sub-national constitutions: A brief  overview 
 
Each of the regional states has its own constitution. The regional constitutions were 
adopted soon after the promulgation of the federal Constitution in 1995 and underwent 
revision starting in 2000. They are supreme regional laws that, as discussed below, can be 
amended only in a special procedure, and each defines, inter alia, the structures of the local 
government units within the state’s jurisdiction. These constitutions have established the 
regular or both the regular and the ethnic local governments. 
 
6.1. The regular and ethnic local governments under the sub-national constitutions 
The regular local government is made up of some 670 woreda and 98 city 
administrations.XXXVIII Only the woreda is created through the regional constitutions; cities 
are the creatures of ordinary regional statute. A woreda administration (or a woreda) – that is, 
a territorial area equivalent to a district with approximately 100,000 residents – is 
established in rural areas;XXXIX a city administration, as the term implies, is established in 
urban areas. Woreda and cities are established on a wall-to-wall basis and, as per Article 50 
(4) of the FDRE Constitution, with a view to enhancing public participation and ensuring 
the provision of basic services.XL 
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Ethnic local government, made up of liyu woredas and nationality zones, is established as 
per Article 39 of the federal Constitution with the purpose of allowing intra-regional 
minority ethnic communities to exercise some form self-government.XLI A liyu woreda is 
made up of a single woreda. It is called a liyu (‘special’) woreda, as opposed simply to a woreda, 
because its boundaries are demarcated along ethnic lines and it is meant to serve as a 
territorial area wherein the relevant ethnic community exercises self-government. A 
nationality zone is established to serve the same purpose as the liyu woreda, even though it is 
larger than liyu woreda as it covers two or more woredas inhabited by a particular ethnic 
community.XLII A nationality zone or liyu woreda is not only an autonomous local unit; 
should the ethnic community for which it is established so prefer, it may also secede from 
the region where it is located to become a separate regional state.XLIII 
As Table 1 shows, liyu woredas are established in five regional states. The SNNPR (as 
stated, the most ethnically diverse regional state) has the largest number of nationality 
zones and liyu woredas. Amhara and Gambella have three nationality zones each. The 
constitution of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state provides for the establishment of 
nationality zones, presumably for the region’s five ethnic communities:XLIV Berta, Gumuz, 
Mao, Komo and Shinasha. However, to date the settlement pattern of these communities 
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Table 1: Ethnic local government units in five regional states 
Source: Regional constitutions and proclamations 
 
6.2. Political and administrative institutions of local government 
Local government units of both categories have a local council, referred to as a 
nationality zone council, woreda council, liyu woreda council or city council, depending on the 
designation of the specific local government unit. Members of the local council (save for 
members of the nationality zone council who, other than those in the SNNPR, are selected 
in a special procedure) are directly elected by the people.XLVI In addition, each woreda, liyu 
woreda and nationality zone has an executive council, which is chaired by a ‘chief 
administrator’ elected by, and from among, members of the local council. A city 
administration has a mayor – elected by, and from among, members of the city council – 
and, as its executive organ, a mayoral committee.XLVII 
 
6.3. Functional competences and powers of local government 
Under the regional constitutions, local government has no clearly defined competences 
except that the woreda is authorised, in general terms, to adopt and implement its own plans 
on matters relating to social and economic development.XLVIII In practice, woredas exercise 
functions relating to the delivery of basic ‘state services’ such as education, water, 
agriculture and so on. Cities also provide what are referred to as municipal services – 
sewerage, garbage collection, urban roads – over and above providing state services 
Region  Nationality zones  Liyu woredas  
Afar  Argoba  
Amahara Oromo, Himra, Awi  Argoba  
Benishangul  Pawe, Mao-Komo  
Gambella Anywaa, Nuer, Majenger  Itang  
SNNP Hadiya, Gurage, Keffa, Sheka, 
Sidama, Silte, Wolayita, Dawro, 
Gedeo, Bench-Maji, Debub 
(South) Omo, Gamo-Gofa, and 
Kemabat-Tembaro 
Alaba, Basketo, Konta, and Yem 
 
Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
98 
including water and education.XLIX Liyu woredas and nationality zones are responsible for 
promoting the language and culture of the relevant ethnic communities. However, the 
specific competences they can exercise for achieving these purposes are not defined. What 
is clear is that, under the regional constitutions, they are authorised to choose their own 
working language and the language of instruction in primary schools.L  
Presumably to symbolise their special status, liyu woredas and nationality zones are 
consulted in the appointment of regional judges presiding within their territorial 
jurisdictions;LI they also elect individuals representing the ethnic community or 
communities in the House of Federation (HoF).LII 
 
7. The establishment of  local government and the role of  the federal 
government 
 
From the overview above, it is evident that there are different categories of local 
government in Ethiopia, each of which exists for a specific purpose. The local government 
units exercise powers and functions that apparently fit the purposes for which they are 
established. Depending on whether they are rural woredas or cities, the regular local 
government units take different forms and structures and exercise appropriate powers and 
functions. Moreover, only the regional constitutions of Amhara, Afar, Benishangul-
Gumuz, Gambella and the SNNPR have provided for the establishment of ethnic local 
government; the others have not, clearly because they, the SNNPR in particular, are 
characterised by ethnic heterogeneity. At the same time this should not be taken to mean 
that other regions are ethnically homogenous. Ethnic heterogeneity in Oromia and Somali 
is most pronounced in their urban areas; since the latter cannot be managed through 
territorial schemes, no ethnic local government has been established in these regional 
states. 
One may be tempted, therefore, to assume that each regional state has used its power 
effectively in adopting a sub-national constitution that delineates a system of local 
government suitable for managing the ethnic diversity of its people and ensuring efficient 
service delivery for local communities. While such a conclusion is not entirely unwarranted, 
it ignores the fact that the establishment of local government was driven by the central 
state and hence was not per se a regional response to regional challenges. The EPRDF-
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controlled federal government drove the agenda for establishing local government, and did 
so in two phases. In the first, it focused on managing ethnic diversity through regional and 
local structures; in the second, guided by the declared aim of increasing the efficiency of 
service delivery and the undeclared one of settling political scores, the federal government 
often chose to empower regular local government at the expense of ethnic local 
government. 
 
7.1. The first phase of decentralisation: Establishing ethnic local government 
Decentralisation in Ethiopia began in the transitional four-year period between the 
EPRDF’s accession to power in 1991 and the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, a 
period that some scholars refer to as the ‘first phase’ of decentralisation and which 
culminated in the establishment of the federal system in 1995.LIII Most of the current ethnic 
regional and local units were created in this phase, brought into existence by a national law 
at a time when the regional states did not yet have constitution-making power and regional 
constitutions had thus not been adopted.LIV 
The main political issue facing the EPRDF then was the ‘nationality question’, one it 
chose to address principally, if not exclusively, through territorial measures.LV The 
organisation of sub-national and local territorial and political units was thus linked 
primarily to the need to respond to the ethnic question. As far as local government was 
concerned, efficiency in service delivery, administrative convenience and the like hardly 
featured in national policy documents until about 2000 – understandably so, because in the 
aftermath of 17 years of civil war, the ‘nationality question’ was the most pressing one of 
the time.LVI 
The constitutional principle for the creation of ethnically organised regional and local 
units was entrenched in the Transitional Period Charter (TPC), a constitutional document 
adopted at a conference hosted by the EPRDF and attended mainly by ethnic-based 
political movements.LVII In addition, the Representative Council, the national legislative 
body in the transitional period, issued Proclamation 7/1992 which identified 63 territorially 
concentrated ethnic communities.LVIII The Proclamation declared 47 of these 63 recognised 
communities capable of establishing their own self-government, starting at woreda (district) 
level,LIX and authorised them to form self-governing areas at woreda, zonal, or regional level, 
depending on the size of each community.LX 
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Accordingly, 14 ethnic-based self-governing regions and several other sub-regional 
units were established. Under Proclamation 7 (1992), minority communities in regional 
states with dominant ethnic communities could establish self-government at sub-regional 
level, beginning at woreda level. In accordance with this principle, the Himra, Awi and 
Oromo zones were established in the early 1990s in Amhara regional states. Moreover, 
smaller ethnic communities could join together by agreement to create a larger unit. Five of 
the 14 multiethnic regions opted to unite and form such a region, known today as the 
SNNPR.LXI These formerly multiethnic regions were further divided into smaller units 
which have increased ethnic homogeneity and became ethnic-based sub-regional political 
units in the form of nationality zones and liyu woredas.LXII Woredas (other than liyu woredas) 
and cities were established as deconcentrated units of the ethnic-based regions and 
nationality zones, without any autonomy. In this way the national transitional government, 
which was dominated by EPRDF, created ethnically structured territorial and political units 
at three levels: regional, zonal and woreda level.  
Ethnicity continued to be a central, politically mobilising concern within the process 
that led to the adoption of the 1995 Constitution and the introduction of Ethiopia’s 
current federal system.LXIII The regions that were created in the transitional period were 
subsumed as constituent units of this system, with the exception of Addis Ababa, which 
became an autonomous federal city.LXIV Moreover, the principle that allowed the continued 
existence of ethnic-based sub-regional units was entrenched in the federal Constitution.LXV 
The FDRE Constitution, that is to say, formalised an ethnic federal system that in fact had 
been created during the transitional period. 
Soon after the Constitution’s promulgation, the regional states adopted their first sub-
national constitutions, given that (as mentioned) the federal Constitution authorised them 
to do so. The highland regions, which are directly controlled by the EPRDF, were the first 
to adopt regional constitutions, followed by the lowland regional states. Some of the 1995 
regional constitutions, most notably that of the SNNPR, provided that ethnic-based local 
units would be established at zonal and liyu woreda level.LXVI The provisions in the regional 
constitutions dealing with nationality zones and liyu woredas purported to have created the 
ethnic-local units for the first time; however, most of the nationality zones or liyu woredas 
had already been established at the point when the regional constitutions were adopted. 
The regional constitutions therefore simply recognised the existing ethnic local 
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governments rather than brought them into being. 
During the period under consideration, the EPRDF was willing not only to deal with 
the ethnic question in constitutional terms but to implement the constitutional principles 
by actually allowing the establishment of liyu woredas and nationality zones. A demand for 
an own nationality zone or liyu woreda was hence more likely to receive a positive response 
than be declined by regional and federal governments. Indeed, as Vaughn states, ethnic 
communities of ‘all sizes, claims, and credibility’ were ‘encouraged by the [EPRDF] to 
organise and mobilise … for self-determination’.LXVII Thus, having established political 
parties along ethnic lines (often prompted or assisted by the EPRDF itself), the elites of 
every ethnic community (or ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’) demanded their own nationality zones 
or liyu woredas.LXVIII A further motive for doing so was to access the increased regional and 
federal funding that the establishment of such units was perceived to allow.LXIX In the 
main, the EPRDF responded positively to such demands. 
The EPRDF also used the establishment of ethnic local government units as its 
preferred way of settling inter-ethnic disputes in this period. For instance, the Wolayita, 
Gamo-Gofa and Dawro ethnic communities had been lumped together initially in one 
multiethnic entity known as the North Omo Nationality Zone, but violent conflict broke 
out in it when the Wolayitas demanded a separate nationality zone for themselves.LXX The 
regional government acceded to the demand, with the result that the zone was divided into 
three nationality zones (Daro, Gamo-Gofa and Wolayita) and two liyu woredas (Basketo and 
Konta). In another case, the former Keffa-Sheka Nationality Zone was divided into the 
Keffa and Sheka nationality zones to resolve conflict between the Kefficho and Shekich 
communities.LXXI  
From the year 2000, however, the federal government’s ‘core agenda’ shifted from the 
ethnic question to ensuring ‘efficient service delivery’ and ‘equitable development’.LXXII 
With this change in outlook, ethnic local government units came to be seen as 
impediments to achieving equitable development and efficient service delivery,LXXIII and, 
having previously encouraged their creation, the EPRDF now undertook a volte-face on 
the matter. At first, it began to show hesitance about permitting new nationality zones and 
liyu woredas. Thus, the Silte ethnic community’s demand, based on the constitution of the 
SNNPR, for recognition as a distinct ethnic community and their own nationality zone was 
initially rejected,LXXIV receiving acceptance only after lengthy litigation that involved the 
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HoF.LXXV Later, though, the EPRDF decided to curtail altogether any further establishment 
of ethnic-based territorial units. As Aalen writes: 
[The Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM)] made a 
principled decision to separate ‘identity issues’ from ‘administrative issues’, stating that the 
request for new zone or special woreda administrations should from now on be considered 
from a purely administrative perspective, which was clearly separated from the right of 
nationalities to self-determination. It was decided that groups which before could argue 
that recognition of a separate ethnic identity should automatically give them the right to a 
separate administration would not be heard anymore.LXXVI 
Hence, as will be discussed below, a process was initiated at the federal level to revise 
the regional constitutions. This revision, however, was not meant to abolish the existing 
ethnic local government units or formally proscribe the establishment of new ones as that 
would have been in clear violation of the federal Constitution. In fact, it was under the 
revised constitution of the Amhara region that the latter’s three ethnic local units were 
recognised and their institutional organisation elaborately defined.LXXVII The revised 
constitution of the SNNPR also created the CoN in which the nationality zones and liyu 
woredas are represented, albeit indirectly.LXXVIII  
Nevertheless, the sub-national constitutional principles allowing ethnic communities 
either to establish their own nationality and liyu woredas or to secede and form regional 
states became a ‘dead letter’ because the party decided not to implement them. So, instead 
of creating new ethnic local units, it began amalgamating some of the existing ones; for 
instance, initially the SNNPR had eight liyu woredas, including those for the Amaro, Burji, 
Derashe and Konso, but the latter were merged into one, the Segen zone.LXXIX The party 
has also snubbed several communities’ demands merely to be recognised as distinct ethnic 
communities, with demands to this effect by the Raya, Qimmant, Wolene and other 
communities not been having granted thus far.LXXX In the same vein, petitions by ethnic 
communities for regional states are met with swift rejection. For example, when the Berta 
community made such a petition, it was dismissed ‘as an unpopular wish of the Berta 
political elite, not a genuine demand of the people’.LXXXI The EPRDF has even intervened 
to prevent the Sidama Nationality Zone Council from going ahead with its decision to 
secede from the SNNPR.LXXXII 
Moreover, the process of revising the regional constitutions was used to weaken 
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nationality zones by transferring more powers and resources to regular local government 
units, this in order to discourage ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ from demanding any more ethnic-
based local units.LXXXIII As mentioned, prior to the revision of these constitutions, the 
regular woredas and cities in each nationality zone were regarded merely as administrative 
units of the zones without any autonomy; thanks to the revision, they were established as 
local government units with a modicum of political and financial autonomy. In addition, 
before the second phase of decentralisation, regional financial grants intended for woredas 
were first transferred to the nationality zones, which retained for themselves whatever 
amount they pleased before transferred the balance to the woredas under their jurisdiction. 
Now the nationality zones are not allowed to retain more than five per cent of the regional 
block grants for themselves even if the grant is first transferred to them.LXXXIV 
The fact that most of the ethnic-based local units were created before the adoption of 
regional constitutions does not mean that these constitutions did not add value to them. 
The constitutions defined the structure of their political organs more clearly. Similarly, they 
defined the powers of nationality zones and liyu woredas to adopt their own working 
languages as well as the languages of instruction in primary schools. Regional constitutions 
also provide for the role that these local units play in the appointment of judges presiding 
in state courts within their territorial jurisdiction. It remains the case, however, that 
nationality zones and liyu woredas were not established originally at the initiative of the 
regional states themselves but were driven from the centre, leaving regional states with no 
choice but to recognise them constitutionally and keep them in operation. Now that the 
ruling party has decided not only to diminish the powers of these local units but to curtail 
any further establishment of them, the states once again have no option but to accede to 
the will of the centre and reject demands for own nationality zones and liyu woreda, 
notwithstanding that the demands are made on the basis of their own constitutions. 
 
7.2. The second phase of decentralisation: Establishing regular local government 
As described, during the transitional period woreda were established as the ‘basic’ unit of 
regular local administration within ethnically organised regional states and nationality 
zones.LXXXV The 1995 regional constitutions created at regional level what Tsegaye calls ‘a 
unitary structure’ within which woredas, but liyu woredas, were merely deconcentrated units of 
the regional states and nationality zones, not autonomous local government units.LXXXVI 
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This was maintained for several years even after the promulgation of the federal 
Constitution. Moreover, in all nine regional states the regular local administration had an 
almost identical structure consisting of three tiers: kebele (neighbourhood), woreda and zonal 
administrations. Cities remained as sub-units of woreda administrations, not autonomous 
units in their own right.LXXXVII 
The second phase of decentralisation sought to give woredas a degree of autonomy and 
was initiated at federal level when the Ethiopian government launched the District Level 
Decentralisation Programme (DLDP).LXXXVIII At this stage, the official position was that 
empowering local government had become imperative because poverty reduction was now 
on the federal government’s ‘core agenda’ and the ethnic issue, a secondary affair. The 
official explanation, again, was that the shift in priorities had been prompted by the 
country’s extreme poverty and its commitment to the Millennium Declaration (also known 
as the Millennium Development Goals, or MDGs), which required poverty to be reduced 
by half in its various forms by 2015.LXXXIX To achieve the goal, it was supposedly vital to 
enhance democratic participation by the people; this would be achieved in turn by 
decentralising more powers and resources from regional governments to woredas in order to 
empower the latter more fully.XC 
There were other, unofficial reasons for this second phase of decentralisation. The first, 
as mentioned, was to disempower ethnic-based local units and discourage the demand for 
them by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’. The second has to do with the internal power struggle in 
the EPRDF, more specifically within the TPLF, the most influential member of the 
EPRDF coalition. The political scuffle was between Meles Zenawi (the late Prime Minister 
and the Chair Person of both the EPRDF and TPLF) and some of the top brass of the 
TPL. Although the underlying reasons remain unclear, the dispute came to the fore in 
2001,XCI the same year that the EPRDF-led regional states began revising their 
constitutions with the alleged purpose of decentralising powers to woredas.XCII Meles Zenawi 
apparently faced strong resistance from senior party members, including Gebru Asrat, the 
then president of Tigray region.XCIII Furthermore, certain leaders of the other members of 
the EPRDF coalition and affiliate parties, including some regional presidents and senior 
regional politicians, sided with the dissenters following the split in the TPLF. This led to an 
extensive political ‘purge’ in the TPLF, the other EPRDF member, and affiliate parties. 
Dissenters were expelled from the TPLF and the EPRDF,XCIV and those among them who 
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had been elected to represent the EPRDF at national and regional councils were 
‘recalled’.XCV 
The scuffle, it seems, also led to the structural reforms that were subsequently 
introduced, especially to those at regional and local government level, because the latter 
were aimed principally at diminishing the power of the regional government; in particular, 
the reforms targeted the regional presidents, who presented the most serious challenge of 
all to Meles Zenawi’s authority.XCVI These aims were served, inter alia, by empowering the 
regular local government units, in particular the woredas. Under the old regional 
constitutions, regional state presidents (also called chief administrators) were immensely 
powerful. Not only were they the head of a regional executive council but the speaker of 
the regional council, which gave them considerable influence over both branches of a 
regional government.XCVII Moreover, the regional president had direct control over woredas 
and municipalities since, as explained previously, these were simply administrative units at 
the time – as opposed to local government units – and as such structurally subordinate to 
the regional government.XCVIII 
It would appear that it was thus decided that more powers would be transferred to 
woredas in order to diminish the power of the regional government.XCIX To this effect, a 
process was initiated in 2000 to revise the regional constitutions of the four highland 
regional states. It should be noted that this revision took place in Meles’ office, on his 
order, and without involving the regional authorities; indeed, it took place without their 
knowledge.C Separation of powers was introduced in the revised regional constitutions 
between regional councils and regional executives; the regional chief administrator was thus 
no longer a speaker of the regional council. Furthermore, autonomous woredas were created 
over which the regional president ceased to have absolute control.CI In short, it was not 
only the case that the central level determined how the regions should revise their 
constitutions; it literally made those revisions for them. This has had several consequences. 
The first is that local government was designed on the basis of what the federal 
government prioritises. This can be seen in the manner that woredas and cities are treated 
under the regional constitutions. Until recently the development policies of the EPRDF 
were centred primarily on the rural areas. Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation 
(ADLI) was the mainstay of the EPRDF’s development policy.CII Cities and municipalities 
were considered important in this policy only inasmuch as they contributed to the 
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development of agriculture and agriculture-based industrialisation.CIII As a result, only 
woredas have been recognised by, and established through, regional constitutions; the nine 
regional constitutions barely mention cities, which are therefore the creation of ordinary 
regional statutes rather than the regional constitutions. This constitutional non-recognition 
of cities is not a mere oversight, however. It reflects both the developmental priorities of 
the EPRDF and the extent to which it controlled the processes leading to the adoption of 
the regional constitutions. 
Moreover, the recognition of the woreda in the regional constitutions does not 
necessarily guarantee its continued existence as an autonomous local government unit. As 
mentioned above, the regional constitutions are supposedly supreme regional laws that may 
be amended only through a stringent procedure which requires an amending bill to be 
approved by a two-thirds majority in a regional council and by a simple majority (in some 
cases, a two-thirds majority) in the majority of the woreda councils in a particular region.CIV 
The amendment of a regional constitution also requires the assent of the councils of 
nationality zones in the regions where they are found.CV One may thus be inclined to 
assume that the regional constitutions not only guarantee the continued existence of woredas 
as autonomous local government units but also put woredas in a position where they can 
safeguard themselves from arbitrary abolition. However, as has been shown vividly above, 
in practice the regional constitutions are amended without strict heed being paid to the 
procedures they set out for this.CVI 
Another consequence and expression of the fact that Ethiopia’s second phase of 
decentralisation was centrally driven is evident in the uniformity with which all of the 
regional constitutions structure the woreda. Woreda boundaries were defined, as per the 
federal policy papers, by taking population size as the principal, if not exclusive, 
consideration.CVII The same criteria were used hence for the demarcation of the boundaries 
of the woredas both in the densely populated highland regions and in the sparsely populated 
lowlands; geographical factors were scarcely taken into account. Thus there are more than 
105 woredas in the Amhara regional state, whereas there are less than 50 in the Somali 
region, which is almost twice its territorial size.CVIII What is more, the differences in the 
economic activities of the highland and lowland regions were not taken into any serious 
consideration. The woreda system is therefore established both in the highland areas, where 
there is a sedentary agrarian economy, and in the lowland region, where the people are 
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mainly pastoralists constantly on the go from one place to another in search of pasture and 
water for their cattle.CIX 
Furthermore, the federal government determines the functions that woredas may 
exercise using various instruments, since the functional competences of the woreda are left 
undefined under the regional constitutions. The regional constitutions simply provide that 
a woreda may plan and implement ‘economic development and social services’ within its 
territorial jurisdiction, without actually defining the specific economic and social matters 
with respect to which woredas may exercise those powers.CX It is hence in the federal 
policies, sectoral proclamations and the guidelines of the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development (MoFED) – rather than the regional constitutions – that the 
specific functional competences of the woredas are more clearly defined. The Sustainable 
Poverty Reduction and Development Programme (SPRDP) and the Plan for Accelerated 
and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) state that a woreda exercises certain 
functions in the area of primary education, primary health care, rural water supply, rural 
roads and agriculture extension services;CXI even so, this is not specifically indicated in the 
regional constitutions. Moreover, the now-defunct Ministry of Capacity Building (MoCB) 
had prepared a draft legislative document on the basis of which regional governments were 
supposed to enact their own legislation defining local government competences.CXII  
In its policy papers the federal government also determines the financial sources of 
woredas, given that the specific taxes woredas may impose, and the intergovernmental grants 
they are entitled to receive, are left undefined in the regional constitutions. In fact, all nine 
regional constitutions authorise woredas to collect, but not to decide on the rate of, land use 
fees and agricultural income tax, including royalties on the use of forests are designated as 
regional taxes.CXIII However, the involvement of the woredas in connection with these taxes 
and fees is limited to assessing and collecting the taxes and fees on the regions’ behalf, 
since these are regional taxes under both the federal and regional constitutions.CXIV 
Moreover, in terms of the regional constitutions, woredas are entitled neither to conditional 
nor unconditional intergovernmental grants.CXV It is at the federal, not the regional, level 
that the policy was adopted requiring regional governments to transfer not less than 50 per 
cent of their annual revenue as unconditional block grants to woredas.CXVI The four EPRDF-
controlled highland regions first introduced a scheme of block grants and the other regions 
followed suit.CXVII 
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The fact that regional states have no constitutional obligation to transfer block grants 
to woredas means that the transfer may stop at any time when there is a change in 
government or policy at the federal level. Such vagueness also allows regional states to 
deny block grants to woredas that fall under the control of an opposition party. This was 
precisely the case in the Sheko-Mejenger woreda of the SNNPR after the 2000 local 
elections, in which an ethnic-based opposition party, the Shako-Mejenger Democratic 
Unity Party (SMDUP), had won the majority of seats. The SEPDM, the ruling party at 
regional level, refused to transfer block grants to this woreda so that it would face ‘extreme 
budget allocation problems’ while under the control of the SMDUP.CXVIII 
 
7.3. A third phase of decentralisation? 
In the past five years the EPRDF seems to have shifted its focus from rural to urban 
areas. It is a new and visible policy direction which is likely to impact on local government 
and hence the relevance of sub-national constitutions in regulating local governance. Some 
link this shift to the 2005 elections,CXIX arguably the most contested in Ethiopia’s history, in 
which opposition parties achieved major success by winning more than 170 seats in the 
HoPRs. By its own admission, the EPRDF suffered harsh defeat in a number of cities, 
losing, for instance, all the seats in the Addis Ababa City Council to the opposition.CXX 
Post-electoral disputes arose when opposition parties accused the EPRDF of vote-rigging 
and refused to join parliament. Violence broke out across the country, and opposition 
leaders were accused of, and jailed for, allegedly inciting it, though they were released later 
after a presidential pardon. 
In what seems an attempt to regain the confidence of urban voters, the EPRDF began 
working soon after the 2005 elections on a new economic and development policy, one 
which was adopted by HoPRs as the ‘Growth and Transformation Plan’ (GTP) in the wake 
of the 2010 electionsCXXI in which the EPRDF and its affiliates claimed victory with 99.6 
per cent of the seats in HoPRs under their control.CXXII The GTP aims to transform the 
country’s largely agriculturally-based economy to an industrially-based one. Thus, in the 
past five or so years the federal government has paid special attention to cities, as 
evidenced by the massive infrastructural projects in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and regional 
capitals to do with roads, industrial zones, housing and the like. The colourful celebrations 
of ‘Cities’ Day’ (there is no such a thing as a ‘woredas’ day’) that recently have been held 
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every year are sponsored by the Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and 
Construction (MoUDHC) and are a further sign of the attention the federal government is 
now lavishing on the country’s urbanites.CXXIII 
With this transformation, however, it also seems to be showing ever less interest in 
rural woredas, and it is perhaps no coincidence that around the time the GTP was adopted, 
the MoCB – the Ministry responsible for spearheading the decentralisation programme and 
capacity-building at woreda level – was abolished. Nowadays a small office in the Ministry of 
Civil Service, staffed by a handful of people, deals with matters relating to woredas.CXXIV 
Despite being recognised in the regional constitutions, the woreda is slowly but surely losing 
its position as the principal unit of local government; as its fortunes decline, so the 





The federal Constitution of Ethiopia empowers regional states to use their 
constitutions to design systems of local government appropriate to their unique 
circumstances. This is a critical necessity for them because their differences in ethnic 
composition and socioeconomic circumstances cannot be managed through a one-size-fits-
all approach to local government structure. However, practice shows that the regional 
states play a diminished role in the establishment of local government units due to the fact 
that federal and regional governments alike are controlled by the EPRDF through its 
centralised decision-making system; the result is that the establishment of local government 
is instead pushed from the centre and used for implementing federal policies.  
In the 1990s the EPRDF encouraged the establishment of local government units 
along ethnic lines, since managing ethnic diversity was considered the most serious 
challenge at the time. Ten years later, though, the party found that the overemphasis on 
ethnicity in the creation of regional and sub-regional political territorial units was leading to 
inefficiency in ensuring development and equitable service delivery. As such, it set out not 
only to disempower ethnic local governments and curtail their further creation but to 
amalgamate certain of the existing ones. In order to drive its agenda of achieving 
development, the federal government closely controlled the revision of the regional 
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constitutions and thwarted the implementation of the provisions of the regional 
constitutions dealing with ethnic local government units. In effect, the regional states are 
unable to decide autonomously on the system of local government they should to establish; 
by implication, the relevance of their constitutions to the task creating local systems is also 
diminished. 
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